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Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class \\ \title{
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT \\ \title{
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF FRESNO
} FOR THE COUNTY OF FRESNO
}

NAREK AVETISYAN, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 22CECG00285

## Class Action Complaint

## INTRODUCTION

1. Defendant United Health Centers of the San Joaquin Valley ("UHC") is a healthcare provider that creates and stores intimate personal health information ("PHI") and personally identifying information ("PII") (collectively, the "Sensitive Information") about its patientsincluding, for example, their names, medical diagnoses, drug prescriptions, lab test results, and social security numbers. But as a result of UHC's negligence, a third-party accessed that data beginning on August 28, 2021 as part of a "ransomware" attack. UHC knew as of at least September 22, 2021 that information was compromised-including extremely sensitive information such as Social Security numbers and diagnosis information-but sat on this information entirely for almost two months, leaving their current and former patients helpless to protect themselves from criminals who may have bought or sold their medical and financial information.
2. Plaintiffs are former patients of UHC whose Sensitive Information was exposed in the breach. They seek damages and equitable relief on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated.

## PARTIES

3. Plaintiff Narek Avetisyan is a resident of Clovis, California.
4. Defendant UHC is a California corporation engaged in the business of providing health care services. Its principal place of business is located at 3875 West Beechwood Avenue, Fresno, California 93722.

## JURISDICTION \& VENUE

5. Plaintiffs bring a private cause of action under the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, Civ. Code § 56, et seq.; the Consumer Records Act, Civ. Code § 1798.80, et seq.; the Unfair Competition Law, Bus. \& Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.; and the common law of California.
6. UHC is a California corporation subject to this Court's general jurisdiction.
7. Venue is proper in the Fresno County Superior Court because the Defendant's principal place of business is located therein.
8. Because UHC is a medical provider with its headquarters in Fresno, California and medical care locations in Fresno, Tulare, and Kings Counties, California, on information and belief, at least two-thirds of the proposed class members reside in California.

## FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

## A. UHC Collects and Maintains Personal and Medical Information

10. UHC is a medical services conglomerate that operates 25 Health Centers in Fresno, Tulare, and Kings Counties, California. ${ }^{1}$ UHC's Health Centers provide a wide variety of medical services, including general and family medicine, pediatrics, general dentistry, clinical laboratory, Xray, dermatology, telemedicine, integrated behavioral health, chiropractic care, optometry, and preventative medicine programs. ${ }^{2}$
11. As a healthcare provider, UHC creates, maintains, preserves, and stores data concerning its patients. This Sensitive Information includes patients' names, addresses, phone numbers, Social Security numbers, driver's license numbers, diagnoses, treatment and prescription information, provider names, patient IDs, Medicare/Medicaid numbers, lab test results, health insurance information, and treatment cost information.
12. The information contained in that data is "sensitive" and "personal" to its patients. Any reasonable person would find that unauthorized accessed to such personal and confidential medical information was highly offensive. UHC thus knew, or should have known, that its patients expected UHC to keep their Sensitive Information secure from intrusions by third parties.
13. It was highly foreseeable that bad actors would attempt to access UHC's data. According to one scholar, "the healthcare industry has faced the highest number of [data] breaches among all industries." ${ }^{3}$ Indeed, "hackers are likely to be drawn to databases containing information which has a high value on secondary black markets," such as "intimate and health-related data.,"4
${ }^{1}$ https://unitedhealthcenters.org/findahealthcenter (last accessed January 14, 2022)
${ }^{2} \mathrm{https}: / /$ unitedhealthcenters.org/aboutus/whatwedo (last accessed January 14, 2022).
${ }^{3}$ Adil Hussain Seh, et. al, Healthcare Data Breaches: Insights and Implications, 8 HEALTHCARE 133, 2 (2020), https://www.mdpi.com/2227-9032/8/2/133/htm
${ }^{4}$ Mark Verstraete \& Tal Zarsky, Optimizing Breach Notification, 2021 U. ILL. L. Rev. 803, 854-55.
"Therefore, relevant and rational firms should engage in greater security investment and reduced collection-all steps to limit the prospects of a potential breach and subsequent notification." ${ }^{5}$
14. For healthcare providers, data breaches entail a particularly severe, foreseeable risk of harm. According to the American Medical Association, "cyberattacks not only threaten the privacy and security of patients' health and financial information, but also patient access to care." ${ }^{\prime 6}$ And the risk of identity theft carries serious implications for data breach victims: "an increased risk of identity theft is akin to the risk of contracting a chronic disease.
15. The risk of a data breach is ongoing. Data-breach notification letters often explicitly inform people that there is a risk of identity theft. Credit-monitoring services are generally offered for one or two years, signaling to victims an increased risk of theft for that time period.
16. When a person has a reasonable belief that her credit identity is in jeopardy, she is rightly afraid that her creditworthiness is out of her hands. The exposure to the risk of identity theft can be anxiety-inducing because identity theft can have catastrophic effects on an individual's life and because it is difficult to resolve. The passage of time may not dissipate that fear because identity theft can happen at any time. A person's financial and employment opportunities can be destroyed by identity theft, and time and money are essential to addressing it. In all of these ways, identity theft is the digital equivalent to contracting a chronic disease." ${ }^{7}$

## B. The Data Breach

17. On August 28, 2021, UHC was attacked by what it characterizes as "an encryption
${ }^{5} I d$. at 855 .
${ }^{6}$ Andis Robeznieks, Cybersecurity: Ransomware attacks shut down clinics, hospitals, AM. MED. Ass'n (Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.ama-assn.org/practice-management/sustainability/cybersecurity-ransomware-attacks-shut-down-clinics-hospitals.
${ }^{7}$ Daniel J. Solove \& Danielle K. Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach Harms, 96 Tex. L. REV. 737, 762 (2018) (footnotes omitted).
event." ${ }^{8}$ On information and belief, based on public reporting in the cybersecurity community, the "encryption event" was a ransomware attack undertaken by the Vice Society cyber-gang. 9
18. The federal Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency defines a ransomware as "a form of malware designed to encrypt files on a device, rendering any files and the systems that rely on them unusable. Malicious actors then demand ransom in exchange for decryption."10
19. Ransomware attacks on healthcare providers and agencies are very common. A survey of health care providers reported that $34 \%$ of them experienced ransomware attacks in 2020. ${ }^{11}$ Moreover, 2021 saw a $45 \%$ uptick in ransomware attacks against health care providers. ${ }^{12}$
20. Notwithstanding the known threat to health care privacy from ransomware attacks, UHC did not confirm that a breach occurred in its systems until almost a month later, on September 22., 2021. Moreover, this confirmation did not come as a result of any efforts by UHC, but as a result of the PHI of UHC patients being posted to certain websites colloquially known as "the Dark Web." 13
21. UHC said nothing to the public or to its patients until November 19, 2021, almost three months after the incident and two months after PHI was posted on the Dark Web. ${ }^{14}$ The notice of the
${ }^{8}$ https://unitedhealthcenters.org/incident (last accessed January 17, 2022).
$9 \quad$ https://cybersecuritylog.com/united-health-centers-of-san-joaquin-valley-hit-by-vice-societyransomware (last accessed January 17, 2022).
${ }^{10}$ https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware (last accessed January 14, 2022).
11 "The State of Ransomware in Healthcare in 2021," at pg. 3 (available at https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/pdfs/whitepaper/sophos-state-of-ransomware-in-healthcare-2021-wp.pdf) (last accessed January 17, 2022).

12 https://www.aamc.org/news-insights/growing-threat-ransomware-attacks-hospitals (last accessed January 17, 2022).

13 https://cybersecuritylog.com/united-health-centers-of-san-joaquin-valley-hit-by-vice-societyransomware (last accessed January 17, 2022).
${ }^{14} \mathrm{https}: / / \mathrm{unitedhealthcenters.org} / \mathrm{incident}$ (last accessed January 17, 2022).
incident offered no specific assistance or aid to affected patients, nor did it identify the specific patients who were impacted by the breach.
22. As a result of the unauthorized access to their Sensitive Information, Plaintiffs and class members suffered injury and damages, including: an increased risk of identity theft or identity fraud; improper disclosure of their medical information; the time and expense necessary to mitigate the heightened risk of identity theft or fraud; and extreme emotional distress and anxiety as a result of the heightened risk of identity theft or fraud, as well as the fact that their personal and medical information was accessed by a third-party.
23. Plaintiff and class members suffered (and continue to suffer) additional damages based on the opportunity cost and time Plaintiff and class members are forced to expend in the future to monitor their personal information and accounts as a result of the breach.
24. Those damages were increased by the unreasonable delay between when UHC learned of the breach and when it informed Plaintiffs and the Class of the breach. If UHC had provided Plaintiffs and the Class with notice in a reasonable time, they would have been able to take appropriate protective measures sooner, which would have prevented additional harm.
25. The data breach was caused and enabled by UHC's violation of its common law and statutory obligations to implement and maintain the kinds of security measures appropriate for protecting sensitive medical and personal information from unauthorized access, acquisition, destruction, use, and modification.

## C. Plaintiff Narek Avetisyan's Experience

26. Plaintiff Narek Avetisyan received medical services on several occasions from 2016 to 2019.
27. UHC made digital records of Avetisyan's personal and medical information.
28. Plaintiff Avetisyan's Sensitive Information was exposed in the data breach.
29. As part of his general cybersecurity practices, Plaintiff Avetisyan maintains an "Internet and Dark Web Monitoring" service offered by the American Automobile Association.
30. On December 8, 2021, Plaintiff Avetisyan's monitoring service notified him that his name, Social Security Number, and Date of Birth was detected on the Dark Web. The monitoring
report stated that the information was exposed as a result of the UHC data breach. A copy of Plaintiff Avetisyan's monitoring report is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit 1.
31. Plaintiff Avetisyan's monitoring service does not cover medical information in its review of the Dark Web. As a result, it is highly likely that Plaintiff Avetisyan's diagnosis and treatment information was exposed alongside his name, date of birth, and Social Security number.
32. Plaintiff Avetisyan has received no communication from UHC regarding the breach. Plaintiff did, however, contact the provided toll-free number provided by UHC. When Plaintiff Avetisyan contacted the toll-free number, an automated message played and provided little information about the breach.
33. Plaintiff Avetisyan has suffered from stress and anxiety as a result of his personal and medical information being exposed to the public, as well as the increased risk of identity theft.
34. Plaintiff Avetisyan was required to spend several hours investigating the data breach, a task he expects will continue to take up his time in the future.
35. The data breach impaired the value of Plaintiff Avetisyan's personal information.
36. If Plaintiff Avetisyan had been notified in a timely manner, he would have been able to take protective measures sooner, which would have limited his injuries.

## D. Data Breaches Lead to Identity Theft and Cognizable Injuries.

37. The personal, health, and financial information of Plaintiffs and the Class, is valuable and has been commoditized in recent years.
38. Identify theft occurs when someone uses another's personal and financial information such as that person's name, account number, Social Security number, driver's license number, date of birth, and/or other information, without permission, to commit fraud or other crimes.
39. According to experts, one out of four data breach notification recipients becomes a victim of identity fraud. ${ }^{15}$
${ }^{15}$ Study Shows One in Four Who Receive Data Breach Letter Become Fraud Victims, ThreatPost.com (last visited, Feb. 21, 2013), https://threatpost.com/study-shows-one-four-who-receive-data-breach-letter-become-fraud-victims-022013/77549/
40. Stolen Sensitive Information is often trafficked on the "dark web," a heavily encrypted part of the Internet that is not accessible via traditional search engines. Law enforcement has difficulty policing the "dark web" due to this encryption, which allows users and criminals to conceal identities and online activity.
41. Once Sensitive Information is sold, it is often used to gain access to various areas of the victim's digital life, including bank accounts, social media, credit card, and tax details. This can lead to additional Sensitive Information being harvested from the victim, as well as Sensitive Information from family, friends, and colleagues of the original victim.
42. According to the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) 2019 Internet Crime Report, Internet-enabled crimes reached their highest number of complaints and dollar losses that year, resulting in more than $\$ 3.5$ billion in losses to individuals and business victims.
43. Further, according to the same report, "rapid reporting can help law enforcement stop fraudulent transactions before a victim loses the money for good." Defendant did not rapidly report to Plaintiff and the Class that their Sensitive Information had been stolen.
44. Victims of identity theft also often suffer embarrassment, blackmail, or harassment in person or online, and/or experience financial losses resulting from fraudulently opened accounts or misuse of existing accounts.
45. Victims of identity theft often suffer indirect financial costs as well, including the costs incurred due to litigation initiated by creditors and in overcoming the many obstacles they face in obtaining or retaining credit.
46. In addition to out-of-pocket expenses that can exceed thousands of dollars for the victim of new account identity theft, and the emotional toll identity theft can take, some victims have to spend a considerable time repairing the damage caused by the theft of their Sensitive Information. Victims of new account identity theft will likely have to spend time correcting fraudulent information in their credit reports and continuously monitor their reports for future inaccuracies, close existing bank/credit accounts, open new ones, and dispute charges with creditors.
47. Making victims' response more difficult is the fact that data thieves may wait years before attempting to use the stolen Sensitive Information. To protect themselves, Plaintiff and the

Class will need to be remain vigilant against unauthorized data use for years or even decades to come.
48. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's wrongful actions and omissions here, Plaintiff and the Class have suffered, and will continue to suffer, ascertainable losses, economic damages, and other actual injury and harm, including, inter alia: (i) from the untimely and inadequate notification of the data breach, (ii) the resulting immediate and continuing risk of future ascertainable losses, economic damages and other actual injury and harm, (iii) the opportunity cost and value of lost time they must spend to monitor their financial accounts and other accounts-for which they are entitled to compensation; and (iv) out-of-pocket expenses for securing identity theft protection and other similar necessary services.

## E. Medical Data Breaches Themselves Are Privacy Injuries

49. When it comes a breach of PHI, the injury and the harm has already occurred. No further disclosure is necessary. As Justice Brandeis once observed, invasions of privacy are themselves concrete injuries and, indeed, can subject victims "to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury."16
50. Medical data breaches acutely implicate the right to privacy, as "[p]atients are highly sensitive to disclosure of their health information," particularly because PHI "often involves intimate and personal facts, with a heavy emotional overlay."17
51. Unsurprisingly, then, empirical evidence demonstrates that "[w]hen asked, the overwhelming majority of American patients express concern about the privacy of their medical records." ${ }^{18}$
52. Plaintiff and the Class had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their PHI.

[^0]53. The disclosure of PHI is highly offensive to a reasonable person.
54. As a direct and proximate result of UHC's acts and omissions, Plaintiff and the Class suffered harm, an invasion of privacy, when their PHI was viewed by an unauthorized third-party.

## CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

55. Under Cal. Code Civ. P. § 382, Plaintiff seeks certification of a class defined as follows:

Any person whose Sensitive Information was exposed to a thirdparty in the breach of Defendant's computer network that occurred on or after August 28, 2021.
56. Excluded from the Class are Defendant's employees, officers, directors, legal representatives, successors and wholly or partly owned subsidiaries or affiliated companies; class counsel and their employees; and the judicial officers and their immediate family members and associated court staff assigned to this case.

## A. The Class is ascertainable.

57. Through the use of data mining, UHC is capable of producing a list of patients who were affected by the breach. Those records identify the Class Members.

## B. The Class is sufficiently numerous.

58. UHC has not disclosed the number of individuals affected by the breach. However, public reporting in the cybersecurity community have described records found on the Dark Web consisting of a patient roster containing at least 5,000 entries. ${ }^{19}$ Thus, the number of affected individuals is, at a minimum, in the thousands.
59. As a result, the proposed Class is so numerous that individual litigation would be impracticable.
$19 \mathrm{https}: / / \mathrm{www} . d a t a b r e a c h e s . n e t / u n i t e d-h e a l t h-c e n t e r s-o f-s a n-j o a q u i n-v a l l e y-r e m a i n s-p u b l i c l y$-silent-after-ransomware-attack/ (last accessed January 17, 2022).

## C. The Class constitutes a well-defined community of interest.

60. The proposed class constitutes a well-defined community of interest, as demonstrated by the predominance of common issues, the typicality of Plaintiff's claims to those of the Class, and the adequacy of Plaintiff and his counsel as class representatives.
61. Predominance. This case presents questions of law and fact common to all class members, which predominate over individualized issues. Those common questions include:
i. Whether UHC engaged in the wrongful conduct alleged herein;
ii. Whether the alleged conduct constitutes violations of the laws asserted;
iii. Whether UHC is a "provider of health care" under CAL. CIv. CODE § 56.101(a);
iv. Whether the information exposed in the breach was "medical information" under Cal. Civ. Code § 56.101(a);
v. Whether UHC owed a duty to exercise reasonable care in maintaining medical information;
vi. Whether UHC exercised reasonable care with respect to its maintenance of Sensitive Information, including medical information;
vii. Whether UHC exercised reasonable care with respect to the data breach notification it sent to the Class;
viii. Whether UHC knew or should have known about the inadequacies of its data protection, storage, and security;
ix. Whether UHC failed to use reasonable care and commercially reasonable methods to safeguard and protect Plaintiffs' and the Class's Sensitive Information from unauthorized theft, release, or disclosure;
x. Whether the proper data security measures, policies, procedures and protocols were in place and operational within UHC's computer systems to safeguard and protect Plaintiff's and the Class's Sensitive Information from unauthorized theft, release or disclosure;
xi. Whether UHC's misconduct amounts to a violation of Cal. Bus. \& Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.;
xii. Whether UHC's conduct was the proximate cause of Plaintiff's and the other Class member's injuries;
xiii. Whether UHC took reasonable measures to determine the extent of the data breach after it was discovered;
xiv. Whether UHC's negligence caused a legally cognizable injury to Plaintiff and the Class;
xv. Whether UHC complied with the statutory and regulatory requirements for sending data breach notifications
xvi. Whether Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to nominal damages under the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act;
xvii. Whether Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to recover actual damages and/or statutory damages; and
xviii. Whether Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to other appropriate remedies, including injunctive relief.
62. Typicality. Plaintiff is a member of the proposed class because their medical information was exposed in the breach of UHC's network. Consequently, Plaintiff's claims are typical of the class he seeks to represent.
63. Adequacy. Plaintiff is an adequate class representative. He seeks relief for all members of the class and will put the interests of the class as a whole ahead of his individual interests. He has no conflicts of interest with any other member of the class. Additionally, Plaintiff has retained experienced counsel who have successfully prosecuted class actions, including data breach class actions, in California courts, as well as state and federal courts throughout the country.

## D. A class action is superior to individually litigating Class members' claims.

64. Class-wide adjudication will produce substantial benefits for the Court and for litigants because joinder of all individual Class members is impracticable and inefficient, particularly when compared to the relatively small amount-in-controversy for most individual Class members.
65. Moreover, the prosecution of separate actions by individual Class members would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications. As a result, class-wide adjudication presents
fewer management difficulties, conserves judicial resources and the parties' resources, and protects the rights of each Class member.

## CAUSES OF ACTION

## COUNT I:

## Negligence

66. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all preceding allegations.
67. Plaintiffs and Class members entrusted Defendant with highly sensitive and personal private data subject to confidentiality.
68. In obtaining and storing Plaintiffs' and Class members' information, Defendant owed a duty of reasonable care in safeguarding this information.
69. Defendant owed this duty to Plaintiffs and the Class because Plaintiffs and the Class are a well-defined, foreseeable, and probable group of individuals whom Defendant should have been aware could be injured by its inadequate security protocols and failure to promptly disclose the data breach. Defendant required Plaintiffs and the Class to provide it with their Sensitive Information as a condition of receiving medical treatment and, as part of its services, then took control and managed that Sensitive Information on behalf of its patients. The foreseeable harm to Plaintiffs and the Class of Defendant's inadequate data security measures created a duty to act reasonably in security Sensitive Information,
70. Defendant also owed a duty to timely and accurately disclose the scope, nature, and occurrence of the data breach. This disclosure is necessary so Plaintiff and the Class can take appropriate measures to avoid unauthorized use of their Sensitive Information, accounts, cancel and/or change usernames and passwords on compromised accounts, monitor their accounts to prevent fraudulent activity, contact their financial institutions about compromise or possible compromise, obtain credit monitoring services, and/or take other steps in an effort to mitigate the harm caused by the data breach and Defendant's unreasonable misconduct.
71. Defendant breached its duty to Plaintiff and the Class by failing to implement and maintain reasonable security controls that were capable of adequately protecting the Sensitive Information of Plaintiff and the Class.
72. Defendant also breached its duty to timely and accurately disclose to Plaintiff and the Class that their Sensitive Information had been or was reasonably believed to have been improperly accessed or stolen.
73. Defendant's networks, systems, protocols, policies, procedures and practices were not adequately designed, implemented, maintained, monitored and tested to ensure that Plaintiff's and class members' information was secured from release, disclosure, or publication.
74. Defendant's networks, systems, protocols, policies, procedures and practices were not reasonable given the sensitivity of the Plaintiffs' and class members' information.
75. Upon learning of the data breach, Defendant should have immediately reported the data breach to Plaintiff and Class members, credit reporting agencies, financial institutions, and all other third parties with a right to know and the ability to mitigate harm to Plaintiffs and Class members.
76. Despite knowing its networks, systems, protocols, policies, procedures and practices were not adequately designed, implemented, maintained, monitored and tested to ensure that Plaintiff's and class members' information were secured from release, disclosure, and publication, Defendants ignored the inadequacies and were unmindful of the risk of release, disclosure, and publication they had created.
77. Defendant's behavior evidences a reckless disregard for Plaintiff's and class members' rights. Defendant's negligence is directly linked to Plaintiff's and Class members' injuries.
78. As a result of Defendant's reckless disregard for Plaintiff's and class members' rights by failing to secure their information despite knowing their networks, systems, protocols, policies, procedures, and practices were not adequately designed, implemented, maintained, monitored, and tested, Plaintiff and class members suffered injury, including but not limited to the impermissible release, disclosure, and publication of their information, as well as exposure to a heightened, imminent risk of fraud, identity theft, financial and other harm.
79. The injuries to Plaintiff and the Class were reasonably foreseeable to Defendant because laws and statutes, and industry standards require it to safeguard and protect its computer systems and employ procedures and controls to ensure that unauthorized third parties did not gain access to Plaintiff's and the Class's Sensitive Information.
80. Those injuries were a proximate and reasonably foreseeable result of UHC's breach of its duty of reasonable care in safeguarding class members' information.
81. Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to damages in an amount to be proven at trial.

## COUNT II:

Invasion of Privacy
82. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding allegations.
83. Under California law, defendants are liable for invasion of privacy if: (1) the plaintiff possessed a legally protected privacy interest, (2) in which the plaintiff maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy, and (3) the defendant's intrusion into that privacy interest was highly offensive. (See, e.g., Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc. (2009) Cal. 4th 272, 287.)
84. UHC knew, or should have known, that its data security practices were inadequate and had numerous vulnerabilities.
85. UHC reckless or negligently failed to take reasonable precautions to ensure its data systems were protected.
86. UHC knew or should have known that its acts and omissions would likely result in a data breach, which would necessarily cause harm to Plaintiff and the Class.
87. The exposure of medical information is a highly offensive breach of social norms.
88. Plaintiff and the Class had a reasonable, legally protected privacy interest in their medical information.
89. As a result of UHC's acts and omissions, third parties accessed the medical records and other personal information of Plaintiff and the Class without authorization.
90. UHC is liable to Plaintiff and the Class for damages in an amount to be determined at trial.

## COUNT III:

## Violations of the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act,

## Cal. Civ. Code § 56, et seq.

91. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding allegations.
92. Under Section 56.101, "[a]ny provider of health care . . . who negligently creates,
maintains, preserves, stores, abandons, destroys, or disposes of medical information shall be subject to the remedies and penalties provided under subdivisions (b) and (c) of Section 56.36." (CAL. CIV. Code § 56.101, subdiv. a.) Section 56.36(b) provides that "an individual may bring an action against a person or entity who has negligently released confidential information or records concerning him or her in violation of this part, for either or both" actual damages and nominal damages of $\$ 1,000$. (CAL. Civ. Code § 56.36, subdiv. b.)
93. A claim for "negligent release under section 56.36 does not require an affirmative communicative act but instead can be accomplished by negligently allowing information to end up in the possession of an unauthorized person." (Sutter Health v. Superior Court (2014) 227 Cal. App. 4th 1546, 1554-55.) Defendants are liable if their "negligence results in unauthorized or wrongful access to the [plaintiff's] information." (Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Court (2013) 220 Cal. App. 4th $549,554$.
94. UHC is a provider of health care.
95. UHC created, maintained, preserved, stored, abandoned, destroyed, and disposed of medical information regarding Plaintiff and the Class.
96. UHC was negligent because it failed to take reasonable precautions to ensure its data systems were protected.
97. As a result of UHC's negligence, an unauthorized third-party gained wrongful access to the medical information of Plaintiff and the Class.
98. UHC is therefore liable for damages in an amount to be determined at trial, but not less than the statutorily provided nominal damages of $\$ 1,000$ for each class member.

## COUNT IV:

Violations of the Consumer Records Act,

## Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.80, et seq.

99. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding allegations.
100. Under California law, any "person or business that conducts business in California, and that owns or licenses computerized data that includes personal information" must "disclose any breach of the system following discovery or notification of the breach in the security of the data to any
resident of California whose unencrypted personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person." (CAL. CIv. CODE § 1798.2.) The disclosure must "be made in the most expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay" (Id.), but "immediately following discovery [of the breach], if the personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person." (CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82, subdiv. b.)
101. The data breach constitutes a "breach of the security system" of UHC.
102. An unauthorized person acquired the personal, unencrypted information of Plaintiff and the Class.
103. UHC knew that an unauthorized person had acquired the personal, unencrypted information of Plaintiff and the Class, but waited four months to notify them.
104. Two months was an unreasonable delay under the circumstances.
105. UHC's unreasonable delay prevented Plaintiff from taking appropriate measures from protecting themselves against harm.
106. Because Plaintiff and the Class were unable to protect themselves, they suffered incrementally increased damages that they would not have suffered with timelier notice.
107. Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to equitable relief and damages in an amount to be determined at trial.

## COUNT V:

Violations of the Unfair Competition Law,
Bus. \& Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.
108. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding allegations.
109. The Unfair Competition Law provides that:
"[U]nfair competition shall mean and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 17500) of Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code." (Bus. \& Prof. Code § 17200.)
110. Defendant stored the Sensitive Information of Plaintiff and the Class in its computer systems and knew or should have known it did not employ reasonable, industry standard, and
appropriate security measures that complied with applicable regulations and that would have kept Plaintiff's and the Class's Sensitive Information secure and prevented the loss or misuse of that Sensitive Information.
111. Defendant failed to disclose to Plaintiff and the Class that their Sensitive Information was not secure. However, Plaintiff and the Class were entitled to assume, and did assume, that Defendant had secured their Sensitive Information. At no time were Plaintiff and the Class on notice that their Sensitive Information was not secure, which Defendant had a duty to disclose.
112. Had Defendant complied with these requirements, Plaintiff and the Class would not have suffered the damages related to the data breach.
113. UHC's conduct was unlawful, in that it violated the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act and the Consumer Records Act.
114. UHC's conduct was also unfair, in that it violated a clear legislative policy in favor of protecting consumers from data breaches.
115. Defendant also engaged in unfair business practices under the "tethering test." Its actions and omissions, as described above, violated fundamental public policies expressed by the California Legislature. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.1 ("The Legislature declares that . . . all individuals have a right of privacy in information pertaining to them . . . The increasing use of computers ... has greatly magnified the potential risk to individual privacy that can occur from the maintenance of personal information."); Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.81.5(a) ("It is the intent of the Legislature to ensure that personal information about California residents is protected."); Cal. Bus. \& Prof. Code § 22578 ("It is the intent of the Legislature that this chapter [including the Online Privacy Protection Act] is a matter of statewide concern."). Defendant's acts and omissions thus amount to a violation of the law.
116. As a result of those unlawful and unfair business practices, Plaintiff and the Class suffered an injury-in-fact and have lost money or property.
117. The injuries to Plaintiff and the Class greatly outweigh any alleged countervailing benefit to consumers or competition under all of the circumstances.
118. There were reasonably available alternatives to further UHC's legitimate business
interests, other than the misconduct alleged in this complaint.
119. Therefore, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to equitable relief, including restitution of all monies paid to or received by Defendant; disgorgement of all profits accruing to Defendant because of its unfair and improper business practices; a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant's unlawful and unfair business activities; and any other equitable relief the Court deems proper.

## PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, demands:
a. certification of the proposed Class;
b. appointment of the Plaintiff's counsel as class counsel;
c. actual and nominal damages in an amount to be determined at trial;
d. a declaration that UHC's conduct wrongful, unfair, unconscionable and in violation of California law;
e. an order enjoining UHC's unlawful and unfair conduct;
f. an award to Plaintiff and the Class of all damages, including attorneys' fees and reimbursement of litigation expenses, recoverable under applicable law; and
g. such other relief as this Court deems just and equitable.

## DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff demands a jury trial on all applicable claims.

Dated: January 18, 2022

Respectfully submitted,
By: $\qquad$
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EXHIBIT 1



[^0]:    ${ }^{16}$ Louis D. Brandeis \& Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 196 (1890).
    ${ }^{17}$ Peter A. Winn, Confidentiality in Cyberspace: The HIPAA Privacy Rules and the Common Law, 33 Rutgers L.J. 617, 621 (2002).
    ${ }^{18}$ Sharona Hoffman \& Andy Podgurski, E-Health Hazards: Provider Liability and Electronic Health Record Systems, 24 Berkley Tech. L.J. 1523, 1557 (2009).

